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Data

Minorities At Risk Project: Home    

Assessment for Serbs in Bosnia

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Bosnia Facts
Area:    51,129 sq. km.
Capital:    Sarajevo
Total Population:    3,366,000 (source: unknown, 1998, est.)

Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References



Risk Assessment

Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) have a low risk of rebellion, while the possibility of protests remains moderate. Serb protests tend to be relatively small and peaceful in nature. Prior to the conflict in the 1990s, Serbs were rather dispersed throughout BiH, having concentrations in the west, northwest and south. As there has been no census since 1991, exact numbers are not available, but Serbs are now primarily dominant in the Republika Srpka (RS). The Serbs have a significant degree of group cohesion and have several political parties. There remains a relatively strong secessionist element among Bosnian Serbs, some of whom are more open and vocal about their desire than others. Despite their occasional bellicose language, these dissenters undertook no violent activities to achieve this goal between 2004 and 2006. Under the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Dayton Accords”), the Serbs have one member of the state three-part presidency and five members (1/3) in the House of Peoples at the state level. The Dayton Accords also set up two entities, the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation), as well as the Brcko District. The RS has a majority Serb population and roughly approximates the control of territory the Serbs had at the end of the war in 1995. Serbs living in the Federation face discrimination and sporadic violence. The Federation is composed mainly of Bosniaks and Croats. In areas of Serb control, there are instances of conflict between Serbs and Croats and Serbs and Bosniaks. Negotiations on police reform to have a more uniform law enforcement system throughout the country failed between 2004 and 2006. The RS is reluctant to give up any of its autonomy. This means that the two entities have separate police forces. While the RS is in charge of its own police force, several incidents of repression were reported against Serbs in the RS 2004-2006.

While elections are free and fair, full democracy is still a work in progress in BiH. The High Representative of the international community in BiH still holds the so-called “Bonn Powers” that allow him to intervene at any level of BiH government to assist in the full implementation of the Dayton Accords, which means everything from the removing obstructionist politicians to imposing laws. Additionally, foreign peacekeepers remain in BiH. In 2004, NATO’s SFOR officially turned over its mission in BiH to the European Union’s EUFOR, which has approximately 7,000 troops on the ground. While there have been no serious armed conflicts in the region since 1999, the Serbs are watching what happens in Kosovo and may try and manipulate the situation with regard to the status of the RS. Violent rebellion is unlikely in for the Serbs in BiH in the near future, however, they may leverage the political situation to their advantage if Kosovo becomes independent.

There are no official political and cultural restrictions against Serbs, however, in areas in which they are a minority, some have reported informal restrictions on their ability to worship as they like. The government in BiH is still not stable on its own without the support and oversight of the international community. There are significant attempts to alter the Constitution established under the Dayton Accords, but there is little agreement on how it should be changed. The current constitutional arrangement is cumbersome, expensive and not workable in the long-term. The standard Serb position on the Constitution is that it should remain intact as is. While Serbs are slightly underrepresented proportionally at the state-level, they control one of the two main entities and have significant autonomy within that territory. Serbia supports the Bosnian Serbs’ rights and forms special agreements and bilateral ties with the RS, but all but the radicals stop short of calling for reunification.

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Analytic Summary

Prior to the conflict in the 1990s, the demographic breakdown of BiH looked like what Cyrus Vance called “leopard spots,” with the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) living together in various proportions throughout the whole of BiH. That is not to say that there were not deep historical tensions but that during the socialist authoritarian rule, these tensions were suppressed, and everyone was encouraged to adopt an identity of a Yugoslav. The cultural history of the Serbs and the region in general is long and subject to political manipulation, but it is generally agreed that the three peoples are roughly from the same stock of people (RACE = 0) while their religions were shaped by the various dominating empires that occupied the region. Serbs are primarily Serbian Orthodox (RELIGS1 = 2), Croats being Roman Catholic and Bosniaks primarily Muslim. Also controversial is the language spoken by the constituent peoples. Serbs (as do the others) claim that Serbian is a separate language from Croatian and Bosnian. To be sure, there are differences in accent and some vocabulary among people from various parts of the BiH and Serbs write in Cyrillic while Croats and Bosniaks use Latin letters, however, most linguists consider them differences in dialect at most (LANG = 0).

Serbs represent about thirty-seven percent of the total population of BiH (GPRO04-06 = 37). Despite comprising more than a third of the population, Serbs control only a third of the BiH presidency (EXECREP04-06 = 1) and House of Peoples (LEGISREP04-06 = 1). This compromise was made during the peace settlement to insure that none of the constituent peoples dominated the others.

Discussion during this period about radically restructuring the administration of the country drew virulent opposition from many Serb politicians and their supporters. The current structure gives the Serbs significant autonomy and any effort to change that draws opposition. The Serbs face discrimination when they are in areas in which they are a minority, particularly in the Federation. They also feel that they are grouped together in collective guilt for war crimes during the conflict in the 1990s and that the Serb victims of the conflict have been ignored and forgotten.

Serbs are well organized having at least 17 political parties, as well as NGOs and civic organizations (GOJPA04-06 = 2). Political parties include: Social-Liberal Party (SLS RS); Independent Social-Democrats RS (SNS RS); Yugoslav United Left RS (JUL); Socialist Party RS (SPRS); Democratic Center Party from Trebinje (SDC); Homeland Party Banja Luka; People's Radical Party from Banja Luka; Party of Peasants and Workers from Kozarska Dubica; Democrat Party from Bijeljina; Radical Party RS (SRS RS); Serb Patriotic Party (SPAS); Serb Democratic Party (SDS); Serb Party of Krajina (SSK); Democratic of Federalists of RS (DSF); Serb Peasants' Party (SSP); Party of Serb Unity; Radical Homeland Front "Nikola Pasic; and People's Party of RS.

Serbs are a significant part of the BiH government. Nevertheless, Serbs feel they are discriminated against for numerous reasons and have lost several cases before the Human Rights Chamber, the most notable of which during this period involved the names of places in the RS. The Court ruled that the name of any place that began with “Srpsk-” had to be changed, because it discriminated against those who were Serb. Serbs generally want the central government to remain weak so that the RS can maintain or strengthen its autonomous status.

The Serbs began to protest what was happening in Bosnia in the early 1990s as they became aware that Yugoslavia was breaking apart (PROT90-91 = 2). The communist regime that controlled Yugoslavia prior to this era prevented most actions of this sort from occurring. Protests resumed after the civil war and have continued to this day (PROT00 = 3, PROT01-03 = 2, PROT04-06 = 3) over issues such as wages and the rights of both returning refugees and Serbs who are being evicted from their homes as the country is restructured. Militant activity reached its peak during the civil war in the 1990s (REBEL90X and REBEL95X = 7). While nowhere near that level, some militant activity has been reported as late as 1999 (REB99 = 1), when there was a minor outbreak of violence between Serbs and the Bosnian army. No rebellious activity was reported from 2000 to 2006 (REB00-06 = 0).

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References

Steven Burg and Paul Shoup. 1999. The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Report on the Status of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004". http://www.bh-hchr.org/Reports/reportHR2004.htm, accessed 10/14/07.

Lexis-Nexis. various reports. 1993-2006.

State Department. various years. Annual Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available online at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

State Department May 2008. Background Note--Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm#people, accessed 9/25/07

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Information current as of December 31, 2006