Assessment for Croats in Bosnia

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Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) have a low risk of rebellion, yet the possibility of protests remains moderate. Croat protests tend to be symbolic in nature. The Croats have a significant degree of group cohesion and have at least eight political parties. While there are some extreme Croats nationalists who demand that a third Croat-controlled entity be established to balance Croats interests against Bosniaks and Serbs, most simply want equal treatment under the law.

The Croats in BiH have only a few of the risk factors for rebellion, including the presence of regime instability and high levels of group organization. Moreover, several factors -- most significantly, transnational support for reform and reconciliation -- inhibit rebellion. While elections are free and fair, full democracy is still a work in progress in BiH. The High Representative of the international community in BiH still holds the so-called “Bonn Powers” that allow him to intervene at any level of BiH government to assist in the full implementation of the Dayton Accords, which means everything from the removing obstructionist politicians to imposing laws. Additionally, foreign peacekeepers remain in BiH. In 2004, NATO’s SFOR officially turned over its mission in BiH to the European Union’s EUFOR, which has approximately 7,000 troops on the ground. Furthermore, there has been no serious armed conflict in the region since 1999. For these three reasons, among others, rebellion appears extremely unlikely for Croats in BiH in the near future.

The only significant risk factor for protest in the Croat case is the new and unstable nature of democracy in BiH. There are no official political and cultural restrictions against Croats, however, in areas in which they are a minority, some have reported informal restrictions on their ability to worship as they like. While Croatia has provided limited support to BiH Croats, the Croatian government is now reluctant to interfere in the political affairs of BiH. The government in BiH is still not stable on its own without the support and oversight of the international community. There are significant attempts to alter the Constitution established under the Dayton Accords, but there is little agreement on how it should be changed. The current constitutional arrangement is cumbersome, expensive and not workable in the long-term.

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Analytic Summary

Prior to the conflict in the 1990s, the demographic breakdown of BiH looked like what Cyrus Vance called “leopard spots,” with the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) living together in various proportions throughout the whole of BiH. That is not to say that there were not deep historical tensions but that during the socialist authoritarian rule, these tensions were suppressed, and everyone was encouraged to adopt an identity of a Yugoslav. The cultural history of the Croats and the region in general is long and subject to political manipulation, but it is generally agreed that the three peoples are roughly from the same stock of people (RACE = 0) while their religions were shaped by the various dominating empires that occupied the region. Croats are primarily Roman Catholic (RELIGS1 = 1), Bosniaks primarily Muslim and Serb Orthodox. Also controversial is the language spoken by the constituent peoples. Croats (as do the others) claim that Croatian is a separate language from Serbian and Bosnian. During the break up of the former Yugoslavia, the leader of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, went so far as to have a new vocabulary engineered to reinforce this difference. For the most part these newly created words were scoffed at and did not really catch on among the general public. To be sure, there are differences in accent and some vocabulary among people from various parts of the BiH; however, serious linguist consider them differences in dialect at most (LANG = 0).

Under the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Dayton Accords”), the Croats have one member of the state three-part presidency and five members (1/3) in the House of Peoples at the state level. The Dayton Accords also set up two entities, the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation), as well as the Brcko District. The RS has a majority Serb population and roughly approximates the control of territory the Serbs had at the end of the war in 1995. Croats living in the RS face discrimination and sporadic violence (CCGROUPSEV104-06 = 3). The Federation is composed mainly of Bosniaks and Croats. In the areas where Croats are in the minority, they claim discrimination and there are instances of intergroup violence between both Croats and Bosniaks. In areas of Croat control, there are instances of conflict between Croats and Serbs and Croats and Bosniaks.

Croats now represent the smallest proportion of the constituent peoples in BiH, comprising only about 17% of the total population (GPRO06=17). Prior to the conflict in the 1990s, Croats were concentrated in western Bosnia, central Bosnia and northern Bosnia, but they also comprised a significant minority in other regions, particularly Sarajevo. As there has been no census since 1991, exact numbers are not available, but it is generally accepted that the hotbed of Croat control and nationalism is in now focused in western Bosnia. Despite comprising only about a sixth of the population, Croats control a third of the BiH presidency (EXECREP04-06 = 1) and House of Peoples (LEGISREP04-06 = 1). In 2006, however, the Croat member elected to the presidency came from a non-ethnically-based party as opposed to from one of the Croat political parties. Nationalists were furious and claimed that this was another sign of discrimination against them and that non-Croats had voted for this candidate. In reality, most analysts agreed that the infighting among Croat parties split the vote and allowed for this outcome.

The Croats minority status explains much of the group’s nervousness about maintaining a voice in BiH. They continue to fear that a revised Constitution will put them at a disadvantage in terms of representation. While Croats are comparatively wealthier than their counterparts in BiH, they complain that they face discrimination in employment (ECGR06 = 1) and areas in which they are in the minority. They also continue to complain that their language is being destroyed and some demand a state financed TV station in Croatian as opposed to Bosnian or Serbian (CULGR06 = 1). This demand is mostly seen as symbolic.

Croats are fairly well organized having at least ten political parties, as well as NGOs and civic organizations (GOJPA06 = 2). Ahead of the October 2006 elections the main Croat conservative party, HDZ BiH, split. The newly established HDZ 1990 was dissatisfied with the concessions it thought the party was making on constitutional reform and wanted the party to return to the values it held in 1990. Various coalitions of Croat parties form from time to time and vehemently castigate those not in the coalition for not serving the interests of the Croat people. The level of disagreement remains exclusively rhetorical, and it is not likely ever to erupt into armed conflict.

Some Croats, particularly Catholic church leaders, have called on Croatia to assist the Croats in achieving their goals, but Croatia has offered only some material support (STAMATSUP04-06 = 1) for various projects and occasional vague statements about the need for fair treatment of all peoples. Since the death of Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian government has been very hesitant to be seen as interfering in BiH affairs.

Croats are a significant part of the BiH government and are actually over-represented as compared to their proportion of the population. Nevertheless, Croats feel they are discriminated against for numerous reasons and have lost several cases before the Human Rights Chamber in which they claimed their rights had been violated. Earlier in the decade, there were some serious secessionist sentiments leading to real concern about the possibility of violence. Several high profile leaders were tried and convicted for threatening the territorial integrity of BiH. These sentiments have subsided in all but a very small portion of the Croat population (POLGR06 = 3), and there is no real threat of rebellion or violent protest by Croats in BiH at this time.

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References

Amnesty International. "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Behind closed gates: ethnic discrimination in employment." http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR630012006?open&of=ENG-BIH, accessed 10/18/07.

Burg, Steven and Paul Shoup. 1999. "The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention." New York: M. E. Sharp.

European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. 2005. Bosnia and Herzegovina Report. http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/ecri/1-ecri/2-country-by-country_approach/bosnia_and_herzegovina/bosnia_and_herzegovina_cbc.asp#P202_51492, accessed 10/20/07.

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Report on the Status of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004". http://www.bh-hchr.org/Reports/reportHR2004.htm, accessed 10/14/07.

Hovey, Guy. April 2000. “The Rehabilitation of Homes and Return of Minorities to Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Forced Migration Review, no. 7.

Lexis-Nexis. various reports. 1993-2006.

State Department. various years. Annual Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available online at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

State Department May 2008. Background Note--Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm#people, accessed 9/25/07

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