Assessment for Gagauz in Moldova

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Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

The Gagauz have virtually no risk of rebellion and, given the widespread powers afforded them as a result of the 1994 autonomy agreement, their likelihood of protest remains low. In fact, the Council of Europe originally criticized the agreement as providing too much autonomy. Nonetheless, support among residents is generally favorable and prospects for the Gagauz appear promising. Further, legislation introduced by the central government in 2005 enshrined the 1994 agreement in law, removing the last Gagauz grievance regarding autonomy. Residents of the region share a strong desire for stability and are tolerant of the moderate policies of the Gagauz councils.

On the other hand, the potential for escalation of ethnic tensions cannot be totally ruled out. Renewed conflict is possible, but the risk of that occurring seems to be small. Some possible causes of conflict include a victory of hard-line Romanian nationalists in the presidency and legislature, which at the moment seems rather unlikely, or a centralization of power by the authorities in Chisinau, which has been a growing concern due to actions of the ruling Communist Party since 2001. Economic decline, which had afflicted the country since independence and threatened to aggravate tension among the population, has finally ended, and the past few years have seen weak economic growth in Gagauz Eri and the rest of the country.

Another key to Gagauz stability is the Transdniestr issue in the east of the country. Thus far, the confrontation has pushed Chisinau to be accommodating towards the Gagauz out of fear of a new violent conflict in the south. This could change if the resolution of the Transdniestr conflict were to cause a backlash against the course of moderation. In this event, the gains made by the Gagauz (and also the Bulgarians) might be reversed. Further, if resolution with Transdniestr includes greater autonomous powers for that region, which seems likely, some members of the Gagauz elite could call for greater political power in the Gagauz region as well, potentially aggravating political tension.

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Analytic Summary

The Gagauz live in a relatively small area of southern Moldova, in districts that have significant Moldovan and Slavic minorities (GROUPCON = 3). They are Turkic-speaking Orthodox Christians whereas the dominant population, Moldovans, are linguistically Romanians (LANG = 2; CUSTOM = 0; RELIGS1 = 2;). The origins of the Gagauz are in dispute. Most ethnographers cite two possibilities. They are descendants of Turkic tribes who settled in Bulgaria from the 12th to 17th centuries A.D. and were converted to Orthodox Christianity, or they are Europeans who were assimilated by the invading Turks (while retaining their religion). In the 19th century, during the Russo-Ottoman war, they fled from religious persecution in northeastern Bulgaria to Bessarabia, a province that was then under Russian domination but is now divided between Ukraine and Moldova. There are very few Gagauz left in Bulgaria today (5,000 according to the 1989 census). Under Soviet rule the Gagauz were encouraged both to retain their Gagauz heritage and to learn Russian, thus serving as a counterweight to Moldova's identification with Romania. As a result, while most Gagauz consider Gagauzi their native language, most also read and speak Russian (only 4.4 percent claimed to speak any Moldavian in the 1989 census). Much of their literary tradition has strong Russian influences. The Soviets followed similar policies toward the mainly Slavic population of easternmost Moldova, the Transdniestr region — the site of another separatist movement that is ongoing.

In the late 1980s Moldovan nationalists took a series of mostly symbolic steps that were widely seen as moves toward unification with Romania. At the same time, a Gagauz cultural club transformed itself into an umbrella association known at the Gagauz Khalk (movement). Most threatening to non-Moldovans was legislation passed by the Moldovan Supreme Soviet in August 1989 that made "Moldovan" the only official state language and required all officials to demonstrate proficiency in Moldovan/Romanian, even if serving in Gagauz and Russian-speaking communities. Largely in response to this law, in September 1989, the Gagauz proclaimed the creation of an autonomous republic. In August the next year, they declared the independence of the Gagauz Soviet Socialist Republic, announced their intention to remain within the Soviet Union and called for presidential elections. In response, the Moldovan legislature declared the Gagauz Khalk illegal and ordered some tens of thousands of young Moldovan "volunteers" to enter Gagauz towns and block the elections. The intervention of Soviet interior ministry troops prevented the incursion of the volunteers into Gagauz territory, preventing any serious violence between the Moldovan and Gagauz irregulars. After a protracted period of low-level conflict between the Moldovan and Gagauz governments, compromise became possible after the 1994 elections in which the moderate Agrarian Party gained a legislative majority over pro-Romanian nationalists. As the nationalists lost ground, Gagauz fears of being incorporated into Romania ebbed, lowering the appeal and support for Gagauz militants and making agreement possible. External factors played a major role in negotiations. Moscow was no longer able to manipulate Moldovan politics as easily (though Russian support for an independent Transdniestr republic continued). The Turkish government persistently encouraged the Gagauz to accept autonomy within Moldova and provided economic aid for the development of the region. The Council of Europe also gave its backing to a limited autonomy plan. The nationalist Romanian government was opposed, on the grounds that it might impede eventual Moldovan unification with Romania, but with little effect.

The new autonomy arrangement, adopted in 1994, established Gagauz-Eri as a "national-territorial autonomy unit." The new entity has its own elected legislative and executive authorities, uses 3 official languages (Russian, Gagauz, Romanian) and is entitled to secession if Moldova ever chooses to unite with Romania. Virtually all of its provisions were implemented during the first year of its existence (POLDIS00-06 =0). Districts with a majority Gagauz population were automatically made part of Gagauz-Eri; in March 1995, 30 out of 36 districts voted to join the new entity (mostly with percentages far exceeding the number of local Gagauz); finally, in summer 1995, the Moldovan prime minister declared an end to the conflict and Gagauz militia turned in their arms and were incorporated into the Moldovan security forces.

Commentators generally agree that the absence of historic conflict or discrimination between Moldovans and Gagauz played a key role in facilitating the agreement between the two groups. Gagauz do not seem to have experienced any serious disadvantages vis-à-vis the dominant population. Nor were Gagauz significantly economically disadvantaged compared to Moldovans (ECDIS03-06 = 0). As a result, mutual hostilities and grievances between the two groups were muted.

At present, the ruling Gagauz are satisfied with the existing arrangement (POLGR04-5 = 3; POLGR06 = 0; ECGR04-06 = 0), and the final step to enshrine the region's autonomy in law was taken by the central Chisinau authorities in 2005.. The group is represented by a number of conventional political parties and organizations, including both pan-Moldovan political parties such as the Communist Party and Patria Rodina party, as well as more narrowly Gaguz parties, such as the Democratic Party of Gagauzia (DGP), The Gagauz Peoples Party, and the Gagauz Movement, among others. The most recent addition to the Gagauz political scene is the vocal but non-violent United Gagauz social movement, established in 2004. Further, ethnic Gagauz were elected in the central legislature in both 2001 and 2005 (LEGISREP04-06 = 1), and one member in the cabinet (EXECREP04-05 = 1). The primary source of external support continues to be Turkey, both in terms of private foreign direct investment, as well as material aid from the Turkish government (STAMATSUP04 = 1).

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References

Bremmer, Ian and Ray Taras, eds. 1993. Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Demirdirek, Hülya. 2001. "(Re)Making of a Place and Nation: Gagauzia in Moldova." Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oslo.

Katchanovski, Ivan. 9/2005. "Small Nations but Great Differences: Political Orientations and Cultures of the Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz." Europe-Asia Studies. 57:6. 877-894.

Keough, Leyla. 2006. "Globalizing 'Postsocialism': Mobile Mothers and Neoliberalism on the Margins of Europe." Anthropological Quarterly. 21:3. 431-461.

King, Charles. 1999. The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Lexis-Nexis. Various news reports. 1991-2006.

Olson, James S. ed. 1994. An Ethnohistorical Dictionary of the Russian and Soviet Empires. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. Daily Reports. 2001-2006.

Socor, Vladimir. 7/7/1994. "Moldovan Concessions to Gagauz Deemed Excessive." RFE/RL Newsline.

U.S. State Department. Country Practices on Human Rights: Moldova. 2001-2006.

Young, Stephen, Ronald J. Bee and Bruce Seymore II. 1992. One Nation Becomes Many: The ACCESS Guide to the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: ACCESS.

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