Assessment for Slavs in Moldova

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Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

Slavs in Moldova (primarily Russians and Ukrainians) are politically and geographically divided between the separatist Transdniestr region on the one hand, and major cities within the rest of Moldova on the other. The numeric majority, which live outside the separatist region, show little risk of rebellion as they do not suffer from government repression, face little to no discrimination and are not regionally concentrated. For the group within the separatist region, risks remain: the Slavs are a concentrated majority and dominate the authoritarian political system; the Transdniestr authorities have their own armed forces and access to weapons; and the group receives financial and military support from an outside patron (Russia). Nevertheless, there are strong factors that mitigate against renewed violence: Moldovan authorities have demonstrated a commitment to the diplomatic process for conflict resolution; Russia's armed forces in Transdniestria serve as a guarantor of the current status quo, which Moldova is almost certain not to antagonize; and there has been no serious violence since the brief civil war in 1992. Further, the international community (OSCE, EU, Russia, US) has increased its attention on Moldova's "frozen conflict", especially since Romania's accession to the EU in 2007 placed Moldova on the EU's border.

While each side's position in the dispute appears intractable (Transdniestria demands independence; Moldova will offer only widespread autonomy), several proposals have come close to acceptance by both sides, suggesting that a negotiated solution is ultimately both possible and more likely than violence.

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Analytic Summary

The Slavs living in Moldova are geographically dispersed, with a slight concentration in the Transdniestr region, along the eastern border with Ukraine, where 38 percent of the Slav population resides. The majority of this group live in urban centers outside the Transdniestr region (GROUPCON = 1), but within Transdniestria itself, the Slavs form a majority at 64 percent, whereas ethnic Moldovans/Romanians account for the remaining 36 percent.

Slavs are a diverse group (consisting primarily of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, but with a very small number of Bulgarians, Poles and Belarusians), and questions arise over whether they should be treated as one group or divided along ethnic lines. Two factors seem to support the former position: one is the Russian language which serves as the primary adhesive for keeping the Slavic groups together (LANG = 2). The 1989 census reported that 80.3 percent of Bulgarians speak Russian as their first or second language (compared to only 57.6 percent of Moldovans). Likewise, 79.7 percent of Ukrainians also spoke Russian as either their first or second language. This shows that the non-Moldovan population is much more linguistically and culturally assimilated to Russian culture than are Moldovans and seems to indicate further reason why most non-Moldovans failed to support Moldovan independence. While current linguistic assimilation figures are not available, there does not appear to have been resurgence of Ukrainian language education or a significant increase of Slavs assimilating to Moldovan language, further justifying the continued use of Slav as a category today. The other reason why Slavs can be treated as one group is that they have shown themselves capable of unified political action. In a 1990 poll, for example, 76.1 percent of Russians supported preserving the Soviet Union (with Moldova in it) as did 72.6 percent of Ukrainians and 88.8 percent of Bulgarians. More recently, Slavs tend to vote either for the pro-Russian Communist Party or pro-Russian Patria-Rodina party.

Historically, the first Slavs settled in Moldova in the sixth century, but major migration to the region first began after 1812, when it became part of the Russian Empire. After a brief period united with Romania between the two World Wars, the territory joined the Soviet Union as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, after which a second migration wave began; more than two-thirds of the present Russian population of Moldova moved there or are descended from people who moved there since 1940. The Moldavian SSSR also included the narrow territory of Transdniestria, which was never historically part of Moldova, but rather a borderland region neighboring present-day Ukraine with a high concentration of Slavs.

Under Soviet rule the Slavs were encouraged both to retain their Slavic heritage and to learn Russian, thus serving as a counterweight to Moldova's identification with Romania. As a result, most Slavs read and speak Russian and seem to identify closely together. In the late 1980s Moldovan nationalists took a series of mostly symbolic steps that were widely seen as moves toward unification with Romania. Most threatening to non-Moldovans was legislation passed by the Moldovan Supreme Soviet in 1989 that made Romanian the only official state language and required all officials to demonstrate proficiency in Romanian, even if serving in Gagauz or Russian-speaking communities. Largely in response to this law, in November 1989, the Slavs in the Transdniestr region declared their own republic in 1990, and like separatists in Gagauzia, they boycotted the December 1991 presidential elections. Later that winter, Transdniestr leaders began a low-level military campaign for complete independence with the tacit support of Russian troops stationed in the region. In 1992, after two years of conflict, a peace agreement was reached between Moldovan authorities and Slav separatists which provided the Transdniestr region with a special status and with the right to self-determination in case Moldova unites with Romania. Later in 1997, when Moldova's unification with Romania was already abandoned, an updated version of the agreement suggested that the conflicting parties should "develop their relations in the framework of a common state." A year later, a troop reduction accord signed between Moldova and the Transdniestr region helped promote the political process.

Nevertheless, Transdniestria has continued building its 'republic' as an independent state, with its own separate government, postal service and currency, unrecognized by any international agencies or other states. Russian language dominates government, culture and commerce, although the official ideology is one of trilingualism (Russian, Ukrainian, Moldovan), and there is no evidence of inter-ethnic conflict. Tensions between Chisinau and Tiraspol, Transdniestr's capital, do sometimes flare, leading to verbal protests (PROT05-06 = 1) and the occasional symbolic protest (PROT04 = 2) by pro-Transdniestrian officials and civil society. The main political party in Transdniestria is Republic, led by President Igor Smirnov, and Renewal, a party representing economic interests; overt manifestations of inter-ethnic relations within Transdniestria are not played out openly in its authoritarian political system.

Within the territory under Moldovan government control, most Slavs seem to be satisfied with the existing arrangement. The legislation to enforce Romanian language was not enforced; several members of parliament and cabinet members are Russian-speaking (POLDIS04-06 = 0); universities, schools, and mass media function openly in Russian (CULDIS04-06 = 0); and Slavs are seen as competitive members within the economy (ECDIS04-06 = 0). As a result, mutual hostilities and grievances between the two groups are muted. Further, the ruling Communist Party is widely seen as pro-Russian, going so far as to introduce legislation to expand the use of Russian language in the Moldovan school system in 2003 (ultimately abandoned after massive street protests). Other pro-Russian parties, such as Patria-Rodina and Edinstvo, also function, although they did not cross the electoral threshold to enter parliament after the 2005 elections. Finally, the desire of some Moldovans to unite with Romania back in the late 1980s and early 1990s ''-- the key factor that sparked the conflict with Trandniestria in the first place – has gradually been abandoned by the political mainstream.

In 2003, the "Kozak Plan" was suddenly introduced by the Russian government, to the surprise of Western powers and the OSCE. At the last minute, Moldova's president refused to sign the document, with the encouragement of Western powers and to the chagrin of Moscow. This has been followed by a series of strategic power plays by the West and Russia aimed at pressing either Tiraspol or Chisinau, respectively, for a final settlement. First was the election victory of pro-Western Yushchenko in Ukraine, which led to the implementation of an EU-sponsored border patrol along the Ukraine-Transdniestria border to cut down on illegal smuggling from Transdniestria and essentially placing an economic squeeze on its businesses. This led to accusations from Transdniestrian authorities about an economic "blockade" being imposed, with Russia rushing economic aid to the region (STAMATSUP04-06 = 1). Second was Russia's increase in gas prices and de facto implementation of an economic "blockade" against Moldova's key wine industry, ostensible for hygiene deficiencies in 2006, damaging its economy. If Moscow ultimately gets its way, a final solution may look similar to the failed Kozak Plan, restructuring Moldova into a federal state and providing Transdniestrian officials (and, by extension, Moscow), a veto over Moldovan foreign policy

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References

Central Intelligence Agency. World Factbook 2007. http://www.allcountries.org/wfb2007/moldova/index.html.

International Crisis Group.8/2003. "Moldova: No Quick Fix." http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A401086_12082003.pdf

International Crisis Group. 6/2004. "Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria." http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/moldova/157_moldova_regional_tensions_over_transdniestria.pdf

International Crisis Group. 8/2006. "Moldova's Uncertain Future." Europe Report No.175 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4340&l=1

King, Charles. 2000. The Moldovans : Romania, Russia, and the politics of culture. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Lexis-Nexis. Various news reports, 1990-2006.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Various reports. 2004-2006.

Seymore, Bruce II, ed. 1993. The ACCESS Guide to Ethnic Conflicts in Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: ACCESS.

Socor, Vladimir. 7/14/05. "Kozak Plan Resurfaces Under OSCE Colors." Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370007, accessed 07/08/07

Shlapentokh, Vladimir, Munir Sendich and Emil Payin. 1994. The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics. New York: M. E. Sharpe.

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