Assessment for Magyars (Hungarians) in Romania

View Group Chronology

Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

An ethnic Hungarian rebellion in Romania is unlikely based on four factors: there is a history of democratic government in Romania; the government is willing to negotiate and reform; transnational support exists for reform efforts; and although autonomy movements exist in neighboring countries, there is no armed conflict. However, the Szekler autonomy movement has grown in intensity since 2003, with groups from the Szekler region of Romania mobilizing for an autonomous “Szeklerland.” These actions contrast with the more moderate attitude of the leadership of the Hungarians’ main political group, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UMDR), which the new autonomy groups claim has not done enough. The UMDR has pledged to pursue their limited autonomy demands through a gradual process, while the more radical movement is clamoring for a more rapid change in status. Tension between ethnic Hungarians and Romanian nationalists has increased with the amplified autonomy movement, but the government has been successful at diffusing tension by being willing to meet with representatives of the Szekler movement.

Despite the political tension, both factions of the Hungarian rights movement are inclined toward cooperation and nonviolence between each other, the Romanian government and other groups in Romanian society.

top

Analytic Summary

According to the 2002 census, there are approximately 1.4 million ethnic Hungarians in Romania, comprising nearly seven percent of the total population. They live in both rural and urban areas, although a little more than half of the population dwells in cities (52.9 percent). Hungarians are primarily concentrated in the Transylvania region of Romania, with about one percent of the population living in other parts of the country (GROUPCON = 3). Transylvania spans central, west and northwest Romania, and is often referred to as the land west of the Carpathian Mountains. Ethnic Hungarians are the majority in Transylvania's central counties of Harghita (84.6 percent) and Covasna (73.8 percent), and there are significant populations in central Mures (39.3 percent), northwest Satu Mare (35.2 percent), west Bihor (25.9 percent) and northwest Salaj (23.1 percent). Their regional base is composed of the counties of Harghita, Covasna and Mures (GC = 2), where 45 percent of all ethnic Hungarians live and where they comprise 59 percent of the total population. These counties are also known as the Szekler region, which is where the most serious autonomy effort is underway.

Szekler Hungarians are somewhat distinct from Magyar Hungarians, but both consider themselves ethnically Hungarian. Szekler Hungarians comprise about half of the ethnically Hungarian population in Romania. Hungarians in Romania speak Hungarian, a Fino-Ugric dialect, but many are bilingual in Romanian (LANG = 1). In the Roman Catholic Csango community of Romania, an archaic form of Hungarian is spoken. Ethnic Hungarians are either Protestant or Roman Catholic, with the majority being the former (BELIEF = 1). The majority Romanian population speaks Romanian and is primarily Christian Orthodox.

Transylvania borders Hungary, Serbia and Ukraine, which all have Hungarian populations. At the turn of the century, Transylvania was a part of Hungary, which is often called the “Mother Country.” The region was transferred to Romania by the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 at the end of the First World War. Under the acquisition, Romania gave limited rights to the Hungarians living within the region. During World War II, part of Transylvania was reoccupied by fascist Hungary, but was later again recovered by Romania after the latter withdrew from the Axis and joined the Allies once it was clear that Hitler was losing the war. Historically, the Hungarians formed the ruling class in Transylvania, for a long time part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. There is a long history of tensions between them and the majority of Romanians, whose rights were not recognized under the monarchy. In the first years of the Communist regime, the Hungarians enjoyed a brief period of territorial autonomy that ended in 1956. Their situation degenerated with the rise to power of a nationalist leader, and the moment of 1989 found many of them engaged in an underground battle against the system.

In terms of birth rates, the Hungarians share the same low numbers with the rest of the population. There are many enterprises owned by members of the Hungarian community, and there are no indications of systematic economic discrimination against them (ECDIS06 = 0). Politically, the Hungarians are represented at all levels of the administration, from city councils to county governors, based on the results of local elections (POLDIS06 = 0). In general elections, the Hungarian party has won seats in every legislature since 1990 (the year of the foundation of the new democratic Romanian state), and they have sent representatives to several cabinets, including the present one.

The grievances of the Hungarian minority have been focused on several issues: greater autonomy in the regions where they form the majority (POLGR06 = 3); the right to use their mother tongue in the public administration and tribunals (CULGR06 = 2); the right to have instruction at all levels of education in their mother tongue; and restitution of church property confiscated by the communist regime. Part of these demands has been already fulfilled by the government, at times under pressure of regional bodies. A recent push for formal cultural autonomy led to a draft law on the cultural rights of all ethnic minorities in Romania, but the law was rejected by parliament in October 2005. The anti-discrimination law sought to guarantee rights of cultural autonomy, minority language use and freedom of worship.

After the 1990 transition to a democratic regime, Hungarians organized rapidly and effectively in various associations based on religion or culture. They later merged under the aegis of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (referred to as UMDR in this paper, but other acronyms for the same group include RMDSZ, DUHR, DAHR or UMDR), which assumed the task of political representation of the community. Support for the Union comes not only from local people, but also from the government in Budapest. Especially under the leadership of Viktor Orban and his party, the Hungarian government initiated measures that allowed it to distribute funds for the protection and cultural survival of Hungarians elsewhere. The link with Hungary was and continues to be very strong, both at the official level (help from the government in the form of financial and logistical measures) and at the level of the society, with many cultural and other types of associations crossing across the border. The Hungarian government has repeatedly supported the UMDR effort for increased local autonomy in cooperation with the central government, and has regularly met with the Romanian government to discuss the status of ethnic Hungarians in Romania (STAPOLSUP06 = 1).

The UDMR has been part of each ruling coalition of the Romanian government since 1996. Between 2001 and 2004, it was allied with the ruling but minority government of the Social Democratic Party (PSD). After the 2004 elections, the UDMR abandoned this alliance to become part of the new ruling coalition of the Liberal-Democratic Alliance (PNL-PD). Guaranteed representation for ethnic minorities exists in Romania: Article 4 of the constitution guarantees all nationally recognized minorities one deputy even if they do not garner enough votes in the electoral process. However, the UMDR is the only party representing an ethnic minority that has won seats through the general election process, so it has not had to rely on the guaranteed representation law. In the 2004 elections, the UMDR won 22 Chamber seats and 10 Senate seats and Prime Minister Calin Tariceanu appointed 4 members of the UDMR to his cabinet (EXECREP06 = 1; LEGISREP06 = 1).

Until 2003, the UMDR was the main group representing ethnic Hungarians in Romania. The UMDR was always somewhat divided on the autonomy question. During the national conferences of the past decade it became evident that there was a strong radical current asking for rapid and substantial changes, counterbalanced by a more moderate wing supporting a gradual negotiated approach. Since 2003, frustrated with the lack of progress made by the UMDR, supporters of more radical change stepped up their efforts by organizing several new groups. These new groups work collaboratively together to coordinate the autonomy movement. In July 2003, the Hungarian Civic Alliance (MPSZ) was founded to make forays into electoral politics, and thus challenge the UMDR monopoly on political leadership, by supporting its own candidates in the local government elections. The UMDR has called the alliance disruptive because it endangers presenting a unified front of Hungarian interests to the Romanian government. In October 2003, the Szekler National Council (SZNT in Hungarian, CNS in Romanian; also called the National Szeckler County sometimes) was founded. Its main goal is a semi-autonomous state called Szeklerland in Transylvania that is allowed to be part of the EU. In December 2003, the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (EMNT) was founded. Although some members of UDMR were present at the founding meeting, significant ideological divisions exist between the UDMR and the new council. Furthermore, on the grounds that the new council is divisive, the Hungarian government refused to invite representatives of the Transylvanian Hungarian National Council to the Hungarian Permanent Conference (MAERT), a consultative body consisting of members of the Hungarian government, Hungary's parliamentary parties, the World Federation of Hungarians and ethnic Hungarian organizations in neighboring states. The Hungarian government has recognized the UMDR as the only legitimate group representing Hungarian interests in Romania.

In 2004, the Hungarian Civic Party (also known as the Magyar Civic Party, MPP) began seeking formal status to participate in elections and was finally approved by the electoral tribunal in 2008. The Magyar Civic Union (also known as the Hungarian Civic Union) was transformed into the newly approved party. Pressing for regional autonomy, the more radical Hungarian Civic Party has also organized to challenge the more mainstream UDMR. The new party accuses the UDMR of politically acquiescing to the Romanian majority and not listening to the demands of the Hungarian minority. Also designed to push for greater autonomy, the transnational Council of Hungarians' Autonomy in the Carpathian Basin (CAMBC) was founded in 2004 in Nagyvarad Oradea in western Romania. It includes all the new Szekler autonomy groups as well as Hungarian organizations from Serbia and the Ukraine: the Hungarian Cultural Union of Sub-Carpathian Ukraine (Ukraine) and the Hungarian Democratic Party of Vojvodina (Serbia-Montenegro).

Street protests are rare, but the more radical autonomy groups did organize a rally to coincide with the festivities of a Hungarian holiday in Odorheiu Secuiesc in March 2006 (PROT06 = 4). Seven thousand ethnic Hungarians attended the demonstration organized by the Szekler National Council and the Hungarian Civic Alliance, an organization that has close ties with the Hungarian opposition party, FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Alliance. In the lead up to the rally, the nationalist Greater Romania Party threatened to counter-demonstrate at which point Romanian Prime Minister Basescu diffused tension by announcing he would attend the Szekler rally. The nationalist party withdrew its plans but there was a simultaneous demonstration organized by the UDMR in Targu Secuiesc on the same day. During the UDMR’s rally, party members denounced the Szekler autonomy movement as divisive and counter-productive to the needs of all ethnic Hungarians in Romania and abroad.

There has bee no violent ethnic tension in Romania is recent years, but some minor repression and cultural discrimination has occurred. In 2005, police confiscated Europai Ido, a Hungarian language publication because it contained articles supporting autonomy. While the police argued that it threatened national security, others in the media said it was censorship. In 2005, due to the opposition of the Roman Catholic Bishopric of Iasi, the Hungarian-speaking Csango community was prohibited from holding religious services in their language. The Csango community complained and the National Council for Combating Discrimination (CNCD) ruled that this was a violation of their religious freedom (CULPO106 = 1) However, by the end of 2006, the community still had no religious services in Hungarian. A government survey revealed that 13 percent of Romania's localities do not grant any language rights to ethnic minorities despite national laws instructing them to do so, and 20 percent have not installed the bilingual signs required by law. However, in 80 percent of the localities with ethnic minorities, laws on languages use were enforced. Although a government decree allows for public funding of bilingual education, many Hungarian speaking communities still do not have classes in Hungarian (CULPO206 = 1). Efforts are underway to expand the program in ethnic Hungarian communities.

Currently, the Hungarians are part of the government, and their efforts have met with limited success. The relationship between the Hungarians and Romanians appeared to be improving until 2006, when the increased autonomy effort by the Szekler movement led to tensions between Hungarians and Romanian nationalists. At times the nationalists have publicly rebuked the Szekler efforts as unconstitutional and called on the government to stop their autonomy effort (CCGROUPSEV104 = 2). It is most likely that gains for the autonomy movement will only be won in the context of national policies that are geared toward improving the status of all ethnic minorities and granting more local control to all regions. Given how mixed the Hungarian population is with the rest of society, administrative autonomy based on ethnicity is very difficult to legislate and no autonomy plan is likely to be supported by the judicial, executive and legislative bodies. Only about 45 percent of all ethnic Hungarians live in the proposed special status region (including Covasna, Harghita and part of Mures counties), and there are minority Romanian populations within these counties. Furthermore, ethnic-based autonomy is at odds with the Romanian constitution, but increased local autonomy is not only constitutional but encouraged by the EU. However, if cultural autonomy for minority groups, which the UMDR advocates, is successfully negotiated, this could pave the way for greater local autonomy in ethnic Hungarian communities.

top

References

Amnesty International. 2006. Annual Report for Romania. http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2006&c=ROM, accessed 9/6/2008.

BBC Monitoring International Reports. 1/19/2004. "Romania's Szekely Community Wants To Join EU as Autonomous Region."

BBC Monitoring Europe – Political. 10/24/2005. "Draft law on national minorities' status rejected by Romanian Senate."

CIA. 2008. "Romania." World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hu.html#People, accessed 9/6/2008.

Freedom House. 2006. Country Report: Romania 2005. http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=387&year=2006, accessed 9/8/2008.

Gordon, Raymond G., Jr., ed. 2005. Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Fifteenth edition. Dallas: SIL International. http://www.ethnologue.com/, accessed: 9/7/2008.

Legistionline.org. 2004. "Law on the Elections for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (2004)". http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/3b/dd/d600561164bf69b7f0b9693ec092.pdf, accessed 9/7/2006.

Lexis-Nexis. Various news reports. 1990-2006.

PDC. 2002. The Analysis of the Preliminay Results - 2002. http://www.recensamant.ro/pagini/rezultate.html, accessed: 9/5/2008.

top