Assessment for Chechens in Russia

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Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

Before the first invasion of Chechnya, then Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev warned that an operation in Chechnya would take "10 minutes to plan, 10 hours to execute, and 10 years to finish." Events have proven him wrong on all three counts, for the cycle of violence was still intense at the end of 2006, although significantly diminished from earlier in the decade. Events change rapidly in Chechnya, but by 2007 rebel forces were reliably numbered at more than 1,000 and rebel attacks against government forces were still reported on an almost daily basis, despite a formal declaration by Russia's government that the military campaign is over and a period of "normalization" has begun. Most rebel attacks are now hit-and-run operations.

The years 2004 to 2006 were a period of great change for the rebels. While the rebels managed one spectacular hostage taking in 2004 (a school in Beslan, North Ossetia), this proved to be their last, as two high-profile rebel leaders – Maskhadov and Basayev – were killed by state security forces. Rebels also managed to assassinate pro-Kremlin Chechen leader Akhmad Kadyrov in 2004. This, however, brought his son, Ramzan, to power and he has slowly consolidated control of the region with Kremlin support, bringing rebel fighters slowly under control through a combination of cooptation and repression. In a sense, the Kremlin has "outsourced" the pacification of Chechnya to an indigenous group of Chechens led by Kadyrov and, to date, it has seen some success.

The Chechens have several risk factors for future rebellion: territorial concentration, recent government repression, a recent history of rebellion and group cohesion. The most likely scenario going forward will be increased calm in the region with limited violence continuing into the future. The risks of renewed large-scale violence are twofold: first, if Kadyrov loses support form the Kremlin there is great potential for a power struggle between Grozny and Moscow; second, there has been increased regional instability in neighboring republics of Ingushetia, Dagestan and beyond where insurgencies and violence have been gathering pace. This instability has the potential to spill over into Chechnya itself.

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Analytic Summary

The Chechens are a majority Sunni Muslim people (BELIEF = 2) whose traditional homeland is located in the Caucasus Mountains of southern Russia just north of Georgia. According to the 1989 Soviet census, 77 percent of Chechens resided in the Republic of Chechnya (formally the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic), and the rest were scattered throughout the Caucasus, with sizable communities in neighboring republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, southern Russia and in Moscow (GROUPCON = 3). In addition, a Chechen diaspora also exists outside of Russia, including approximately 100,000 in Kazakhstan and 250,000 in Jordan, who were expelled from Chechnya in the 1940s.

Chechens have deep traditions of loyalty based on clan and family identity that are perhaps stronger than their overall group identity. However, all Chechens are united by their particularly strong brand of Islam, which has helped define their cultural differences with Russians. Even when Communist authorities were expropriating religious institutions in other parts of the USSR, the number of mosques in Chechnya actually increased. While religion is practiced openly in Chechnya, there were credible reports that officials, journalists and society more generally discriminated against religion coming from Chechnya, associating it with terrorism, especially after the 2004 Beslan hostage incident, in which more than 350 people died (CULPO106 = 1).

The Chechen group identity has also been forged to a large degree by their historical tradition of resistance to Russian rule. They have a very strong warrior tradition that dates back centuries, but is particularly defined by decades of remarkable resistance to the czar against overwhelming odds. Since 1994 that conflict has been playing itself out again, as Moscow sent troops to Chechnya to crush nationalist Chechen rebels that were pressing for independence (REB04-06 = 5).

Three centuries of persecution by, and resistance to, Moscow have created a potent reservoir of historical animosity between the two peoples. For most Chechen fighters, the recent phase of the Russo-Chechen conflict is simply the latest in a series of (both active and passive) holy wars against Russia. Furthermore, the traditional (Islamic) Sufi brotherhoods, to which Chechens have rallied amidst crises, have served a useful military purpose by bolstering the tactical sustainability of clan-based, small-unit guerrilla operations. The Chechens currently face severe political and economic discrimination (POLDIS06 = 4; ECDIS06 = 4).

In 1991 President Dudayev of Chechnya proclaimed independence, which was not recognized by Russia. Negotiations aimed at finding a peaceful middle ground went nowhere, for the Chechens demanded independence and Moscow was unwilling to let the new Russian Federation splinter. In addition, Chechnya is located in strategic territory – in 1994 the pipelines carrying oil and gas from the Caspian Sea ran right through its capital, Grozny. In December 1994, Russian troops invaded the rebellious republic.

Despite overwhelming numerical and technical superiority, the Russian military failed to break the resistance of a determined insurgent force. The war was sharply criticized by the domestic and international community, which successfully pressured Yeltsin into granting the region de facto independence in 1996 after the rebels forced Russian troops out of Grozny. Liberal, reformist and reactionary elements in Russia charged the regime of incompetence and incoherence.

Russian and Chechen leaders signed a peace accord on August 31, 1996. But neither this nor another accord in 1997 contributed seriously to the resolution of the conflict. The 1996 accord did not settle the future status of Chechnya, putting the issue aside for another five years, and the 1997 accord attempted to improve the Russian-Chechen relations despite the unresolved issues surrounding the break away region.

No progress was made on Chechnya's status in the next three years, as virtual anarchy descended over Chechnya. Kidnappings and terrorist acts in Chechnya and in the territories of neighboring Ingushetia and Dagestan, as well as contacts between Chechen separatists and international Islamic organizations, indicated that the Chechen opposition sought independence for itself and for all neighboring Transcaucasian Muslim territories. New Chechen President Maskhadov was unable to control a band of Chechen militants who apparently believed that, with some provocation, the mountain peoples of the Caucasus would take up arms against Moscow. They were quite mistaken, for no other group showed an eagerness to repeat the experience of the Chechens.

The second Russian intervention in Chechnya, in October 1999, came as no surprise. Many observers suspect that the Putin government was planning to renew hostilities, and the ill-advised Chechen incursions into Dagestan and alleged involvement in terrorist acts in Russian cities merely provided excuses to invade. Either way, Putin promised a different war, one that would be shorter, cleaner and successful. The Russian people, eager to avenge their national humiliation and the terrorism that Chechens seemed to be perpetuating, have thus far supported the policy of their government in Chechnya.

Putin has delivered on his promise of a "different" war – this second campaign has been even more brutal than the last. Human Rights Watch reports that signs of human decency have been harder to find in this round of fighting, with increases in indiscriminate killing, "disappearances," torture, beatings and the like being perpetrated by both sides, but especially by the "police" units of the Russian Interior Ministry. By the end of 1999, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that there were 200,000 Chechen refugees in Ingushetia and another 100,000 elsewhere in the Caucasus. Many of those refugees were forced to return in 2002 and 2003 when Russian officials abruptly declared Chechnya to be "safe" and proceeded to close refugee camps.

Seven years of warfare have transformed Chechnya into one of the world's truly hellish regions. In addition to the obvious hazards of war, FEWER reports that at least 80 percent of the population is unemployed and utterly impoverished, and justice is meted out by both sides in a manner that is best described as haphazard. While active warfare has officially ended, the situation for Chechens remains bleak with forced disappearances, torture, arbitrary detention, and massacres perpetuated by Russian forces on a daily basis. This repression has affected both civilians (REPGENCIV04-06 = 5) and rebel fighters (REPVIOL04-06 = 5). Violence against the state from Chechen rebels also continues at an almost daily rate (REB04-06 = 5). Police harassment against Chechens in other parts of the Russian Federation have also increased, with arbitrary identity-checks, arrests, and refusals to grant obligatory residency permits in cities such as Moscow.

More broadly, within Russian society there are active discrimination, violence and intimidation against ethnic Chechen civilians. This has included several attacks on the Moscow metro (CCGROUPSEV04 = 2), a 2005 attack on Chechens by Russian skinheads (CCGROUPSEV05 = 1) and a 2006 pogrom against Chechens in Kondopoga leading to at least two deaths (CCGROUPSEV06 = 4).

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References

Amnesty International. Various reports 2000-2006

Gammer, Moshe. 2005. The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule. London: C. Hurst & Co.

Hughes, James. 2007. Chechnya, From Nationalism to Jihad. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Human Rights Watch. Various reports 1995-2003.

Lexis-Nexis. Various news reports. 1990-2006.

U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia. 1999-2006.

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