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Assessment for Malay-Muslims in Thailand

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Thailand Facts
Area:		514,000 sq. km.
Capital:		Bangkok
Total Population:		60,037,000 (source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1998, est.)

Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

The Muslims in Thailand have four of the factors that increase the likelihood of maintaining the current rebellion: an active insurgency movement; territorial concentration; government repression of group members; and a history of lost autonomy. Factors that encourage the current rebellion include a history of neglect and marginalization against the Malay-Muslim community, possible foreign aid and/or recruitment to the rebellion movement, and the inability of the Thai government to shed its anti-Muslim reputation. A bloodless coup in September 2006, staged by the Thai Royal Army, disposed of a controversial and divisive Prime Minister. However, it remains to be seen if the new administration will be effective in tackling the issue of domestic reconciliation in the South. If any progress is to occur, the new regime must end corruption within its security forces and engage in active consensus-building with the Muslim community. Political restrictions, a new and potentially unstable regime, recent repression against the group, and budding kindred support continue to place the Malay-Muslim community at a risk for protest.

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Analytic Summary

The Muslims are primarily concentrated in Thailand's five southern provinces which border Malaysia: Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satun, and Songkhla (GROUPCON = 3. There has been no significant group migration across the country's regions since the early 1900s.

The Muslims are a religious minority in a country in which Buddhism, the religion of the majority Thai community, is the official state religion (BELIEF = 2). The social customs of the Muslims differ from those of the Thais and although some Muslims speak Thai, some 80% are Malay-speakers (LANG = 2; CUSTOM = 1). Group members who reside in the western Satun province speak Thai, and they are fairly integrated into Thai society. Those concentrated in Pattani, which was once a semi-autonomous sultanate of Malaya, have maintained the use of the Malay language (AUTLOST = 1).

Beginning in the 1930s, successive Thai military regimes attempted to instill a common nationalism among the country's population through measures such as a compulsory education program that utilized the Thai language and the celebration of national holidays. Malaysian independence in 1959 brought the attention of Thai authorities to the southern Muslim regions. This was partly due to Pattani's former status as a Malayan sultanate which raised concerns about potential links between Malay kin in the two countries. Government programs in the south were implemented by Thais who often did not speak Malay and/or did not understand the population's Islamic customs and beliefs. Further, the region remained economically underdeveloped in comparison to much of the country.

Muslim resentment against the government’s assimilation policies turned from localized resistance to broad support for the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) by the early 1970s. The PULO rebellion began in the late 1960s with the most intense phase emerging in the early to mid 1970s (REB65X = 4; REB70X = 6). The separatist rebels were reported to have been aided by Libya. In the 1980s, the Thai government sought to address some Muslim demands through a combination of programs that promoted their political participation along with policies to further economic development and religious toleration.

Group members face significant demographic stresses. These include declining public health conditions in relation to other groups, high birth rates, environmental decline due to widespread flooding, and migration abroad for economic reasons. The Muslims are substantially underrepresented in the political and economic arenas due to historical neglect or restrictions, but public policies seek to improve the group's status (ECDIS06 = 1). A major setback occurred in 2005, however, when the Thai government issued an Emergency Decree in an attempt to quell the upsurge in violence. Two main provisions of the decree, one granting law enforcement officers immunity from prosecution and the other suspending the jurisdiction of administrative courts to prosecute officials for human rights violations, leave citizens with no redress for abuses. Despite some legal safeguards, the decree leaves loopholes that heighten the risk of arbitrary detention and mistreatment of detainees (POLDIS06 = 1). Additionally, group members still remain underrepresented at the local and provincial levels.

Most Muslims are seeking widespread autonomy for the southern provinces where they primarily reside (SEPX06 = 3). A growing minority, composed mainly of insurgency organizations, favors the creation of an independent state (POLGR06 = 4). Other group demands include greater political participation in all levels of decision-making, equal civil rights and status, and better economic opportunities including a larger share of public funds (ECGR06=2). In addition, the Muslims are concerned about protecting their cultural and religious beliefs, and ending alleged Thai governmental discrimination (CULGR06 = 1).

Group members are primarily represented by militant organizations such as the PULO and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) but also by conventional national political parties that represent broader interests (GOJPA06 = 4). However, the resurgence of a hostile separatist movement in 2004 has undermined nonviolent attempts made by conventional parties to promote Malay-Muslim regional interests. A growing minority is reported to support the activities of rebel organizations. The emergence of intragroup hostilities has accompanied the insurrection, as insurgents hope to intimidate those who do not embrace the rebellion and/or to poison an already tenuous Muslim-Thai relationship (INTRACON06 = 1). Also, there were widespread reports of violence between Muslims and Buddhists in recent years, especially those living in the Malay-Muslim dominated southernmost provinces (INTERCON06 = 1).

The neighboring state of Malaysia has politically supported the goals of the Thai Muslims, but Kuala Lumpur does not appear to be actively supporting the separatist campaign. A litany of accusations levied at Malaysia by the Thai government has been met with vehement denials by Kuala Lumpur. Conflicting outside reports fail to substantiate the claims of either side, and it remains to be seen whether Malaysia is undertaking an active role in harboring and/or financing Thai insurgents. However, Malay organizations, such as the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, have sent charity missions into the region in recent years (KINSUP05-06 = 1).

It appears that the separatist campaign lost much of its momentum in the 1980s. Although sporadic violent attacks were attributed to PULO and the BRN during the late 1990s, it is not clear if these rebel groups were responsible or whether the attacks were by bandit organizations. Beginning in 2000, violence has increased and become more frequent (REB00-05 = 4, REB06 = 5). In 2004, a full-fledged insurgency movement reappeared following a series of grave human rights abuses and excessive uses of force by Thai authorities. Repression by state authorities has been severe as well (REPGENCIV06 = 5, REPVIOL06 = 5). Thai authorities admitted to the use of a blacklist in 2005, containing the names of suspected insurgency members and/or its sympathizers. Muslim actions in the form of demonstrations and strikes first began in the post-WWII period, and in recent years these protests have declined as the separatist movement gained momentum. One such incident at the Tak Bai police station, in which more than 80 protestors died at the hands of Thai security forces, has only served to fuel the separatist movement (PROT04 = 3).

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